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Abstract
I develop a model of an R&D race with knowledge accumulation. The knowledge
that a firm has acquired as a by-product of its investment in R&D is valuable even
if success is not immediate because it helps the firm to make the discovery later on.
My model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution
that troubles existing models of R&D races. Hence, firms’ knowledge stocks are no
longer irrelevant to their behavior during the R&D race, and knowledge accumulation
has strategic implications. Unlike multi-stage race models, knowledge is productive in
my model. In this more general setting, I obtain results that stand in marked contrast
to the previous literature. In particular, under some conditions, the firm who is behind
in the race engages in catch-up behavior. The resulting pattern of strategic interactions
(action-reaction) is consistent with empirical research on R&D races.
The model does not in general allow for an analytical solution, and I show how
numerical techniques (projection methods) can be used instead. An accuracy check
indicates that the approximations yield a good description of the equilibrium payoffs
and strategies.
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1 Introduction
In an R&D race, firms compete to be the first to make a discovery by investing in R&D.
The firm which makes the discovery first is awarded a prize, often in the form of a patent,
whereas the remaining firms either receive nothing at all or a smaller prize. As a by-product
of its investment in R&D, a firm accumulates knowledge. This raises the question whether
and how this knowledge accumulation affects firms’ behavior. In particular, what are the
strategic implications of knowledge accumulation in an R&D race?
Suppose, for example, that the competing firms have unequal knowledge stocks. Does
the lagging firm succumb to the leading firm or does it step up its investment in R&D in
an attempt to make up for the leader’s advantage? Casual observation suggests that the
laggard strives to catch up with the leader. When Transmeta unveiled its power-stingy
Intel-compatible Crusoe chip in 2000, Intel pledged to introduce a version of its Pentium III
processor that matches Crusoe’s power consumption in the first half of 2001 and announced
a new set of technologies for 2002 or 2003 that would give it the lead over Transmeta.1
Similarly, after Celera Genomics in 1998 challenged the Human Genome Project to be the
first to sequence the human genome, the Human Genome Project announced that it will
move up its target date from 2005 to 2003 and indeed dramatically stepped up its own
pace during 1999. And yet, although Celera Genomics started the race as the underdog,
it completed a draft of the human genome in 2000 and beat the Human Genome Project.2
The existing models of R&D races cannot explain this pattern of strategic interactions. In
fact, in so-called memoryless races, knowledge accumulation has no strategic implications,
whereas the laggard gives way to the leader in multi-stage races.3
In memoryless R&D race models, the knowledge that firms have acquired as a result of
their past R&D efforts is irrelevant to their current R&D efforts (Loury 1979, Lee & Wilde
1980, Reinganum 1981, Reinganum 1982). This is driven by the assumption that the time of
a successful innovation is exponentially distributed. Because of the memorylessness property
of the exponential distribution, memoryless R&D race models by design cannot capture
history dependence. In other words, knowledge accumulation has no strategic implications
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because there is no value to knowledge.
Multi-stage race models attempt to circumvent the memorylessness property in order to
allow for history dependence. These models account for the possibility that one firm may be
ahead of another by introducing intermediate steps into the research process. Thus, to win
the race, a firm must be the first to complete all stages of the R&D project. Deterministic
multi-stage race models assume that firms transit from one stage to the next in a determin-
istic fashion (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz & Tirole 1983, Harris & Vickers 1985a, Harris &
Vickers 1985b, Lippman & McCardle 1988). The outcome is ²-preemption: The slightest ad-
vantage of one firm causes the other to immediately drop out of the race. This strong result
is moderated somewhat when the stage-to-stage transitions are assumed to be probabilistic.
Grossman & Shapiro (1987), Harris & Vickers (1987), and Lippman & McCardle (1987)
adopt the stochastic structure of the memoryless R&D race models and assume that the
time to completion of each stage is exponentially distributed. Consequently, while a firm’s
investment in R&D depends on the number of stages it and its rival have left to complete,
within each stage the memorylessness property renders firms’ current R&D efforts indepen-
dent of their past R&D efforts. In these models the follower devotes less resources to R&D
than the leader. The follower therefore tends to fall further behind as the race progresses
whereas the leader tends to build up its advantage. This leads to increasing dominance.4
²-preemption and increasing dominance imply that the R&D race is effectively decided
once a firm falls behind. Thus, the R&D race consists of a short but intense battle at the
outset of game, followed by a phase during which the winner of the battle completes the R&D
project essentially unimpaired by competitive pressures. In contrast, casual observation as
well as empirical evidence (Grabowski & Baxter 1973, Scherer 1992, Khanna 1995, Lerner
1997) indicates that, at least in some cases, the firm that is behind engages in catch-up
behavior, thereby leading to drawn-out battles between firms. Hence, the evidence suggests
a pattern of strategic interaction that is more like action-reaction than increasing dominance.
I develop a general model of an R&D race with knowledge accumulation that is consistent
with the evidence. In particular, I provide conditions under which the follower invests more
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in R&D than the leader, so that a pattern of action-reaction results. As the game can no
longer be solved analytically, I apply projection methods to solve the partial differential
equation that characterizes a firm’s value function. Special considerations arise since I need
not only a good approximation of the value function but also good approximations of its
partial derivatives to compute the Nash equilibrium in feedback strategies.
The memoryless R&D race models are a special case of my model. I show that, apart
from this special case, knowledge accumulation shapes firms’ equilibrium payoffs and strate-
gies, and therefore has strategic implications. This demonstrates how restrictive the the
memoryless R&D race models are. The main findings are as follows. First, I show that
a firm is inclined to scale back its investment in R&D as its knowledge stock increases.
Second, as the race progresses, the follower eventually works harder than the leader. Un-
derlying these results is what I call the pure knowledge effect. The source of this effect is
that a firm’s past R&D efforts contribute to its chances of winning the R&D race. In other
words, knowledge is productive in my model and therefore valuable to firms. On the other
hand, it is also possible that the follower works less than the leader in the early stages of the
race provided that there are increasing returns to knowledge accumulation. Third, a firm
can either respond aggressively or submissively to an increase in its rival’s knowledge stock.
I show that a firm responds aggressively if it has a sufficiently large knowledge stock and
submissively otherwise. Simulations of the evolution of the R&D race suggest that these
strategic considerations are dominated by the pure knowledge effect. Fourth, competition
(as measured by the sum of firms’ R&D expenditures) is not necessarily fiercest when firms
are neck-and-neck. This again contrasts with multi-stage race models. In multi-stage race
models, competition is most intense in these situations because the race is effectively decided
once a firm pulls ahead of its rival.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model.
Section 3 outlines the computational strategy. Section 4.1 analyzes the impact of knowledge
accumulation on the equilibrium payoffs and strategies. I also describe how the equilibrium
changes with the value of the patent and and the degree of patent protection. Section 4.2
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discusses how the race unfolds over time. While I study a small number of examples in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I show in Section 4.3 that the economic intuition underlying these
examples generalizes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an R&D race in which two firms compete to be the first to make a discovery.
As a firm invests in R&D, its chances to immediately make the discovery increase and, in
addition, the firm adds to its knowledge stock. On the other hand, the firm’s knowledge
stock may depreciate over time. Its knowledge stock is a measure of the firm’s past R&D
efforts, and is valuable to the extent that, even if success is not immediate, it helps the firm to
make the discovery later on. Knowledge accumulation thus gives rise to history dependence.
Incorporating knowledge accumulation into the model is important because it allows me to
capture phenomena like learning and organizational forgetting. As I explain below in greater
detail, history dependence also arises if R&D is done through experimentation.
For simplicity, I assume that firms may differ in the knowledge stocks they possess at
the outset of the R&D race, but are identical in every other respect. Time is continuous and
the horizon is infinite.
Knowledge Accumulation. Let zi(t) denote firm i’s accumulated knowledge and ui(t)
its rate of knowledge acquisition at time t. zi(t) is a measure of the firm’s past R&D efforts
and ui(t) represents its current R&D effort. To simplify notation, I write zi and ui instead
of zi(t) and ui(t), respectively. Firm 1’s accumulated knowledge evolves according to
z˙1 = u1 − δz1, z1(0) = z01 ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0.
If δ > 0, the firm’s knowledge stock depreciates over time.
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Distribution of Success Times. Firm 1’s hazard rate of successful innovation is given
by
h1 = λu1 + γz
ψ
1 , λ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, ψ > 0.
The hazard rate represents the rate at which the discovery is made at a certain point in
time given that it has not been made before. λ measures the effectiveness of current R&D
effort in making the discovery and γ the effectiveness of past R&D efforts. The parameter
ψ determines the marginal impact of past R&D efforts. Depending on the value of ψ, h1 is
concave (ψ < 1), linear (ψ = 1), or convex (ψ > 1) in z1.5
The special case of γ = 0 corresponds to the memoryless R&D race models analyzed
by Reinganum (1981, 1982). These models assume an exponential distribution of success
times, which implies that the hazard rate is independent of past R&D efforts. If γ > 0, the
model allows for history dependence. Hence, the knowledge stocks that firms have acquired
as a result of their past R&D efforts are no longer irrelevant to firms’ current R&D efforts
and thus to the outcome of the race. This allows me to model learning and organizational
forgetting and R&D through experimentation.
Learning and Organizational Forgetting. Many empirical studies have documented
learning in a production context (“learning-by-doing”). In general, learning means that a
firm’s past experiences add to its current capabilities. Learning may occur when the practices
of the organization as a whole are altered in light of past experiences. It may also occur when
an R&D project is cumulative in the sense that researchers need to draw on intermediate
results in order to make a discovery. I capture this in my model by setting γ > 0.
More recently, it has been shown that firms not only learn but also forget (Argote,
Beckman & Epple 1990, Benkard 2000). To the extent that a firm’s experience is embodied
in its workers, organizational forgetting happens because of turnover and layoffs. If there
is organizational forgetting, a firm’s stock of experience depreciates over time. This implies
that a firm’s recent experiences are more relevant for making the discovery than its distant
experiences. I allow for organizational forgetting by setting δ > 0.
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R&D through Experimentation. History dependence also arises if R&D is done through
experimentation.6 To see this, suppose that R&D is conducted by growing cultures of bac-
teria. Because it takes time for the culture to grow, the results from a culture that is started
in the present will not be available for some time. To capture this, let u1 be the number of
experiments that firm 1 starts in the present (i.e., the firm’s current R&D effort) and z1 the
stock of experiments that are still in progress (i.e., the firm’s past R&D efforts). If results
become available at a hazard rate of δ, then the law of motion for the stock of experiments
is z˙1 = u1 − δz1. The firm makes the discovery and thus wins the race once an experiment
ends in a success. Hence, if success occurs among the results that become available at a
hazard rate of γδ , then the hazard rate of successful innovation is h1 = δ
(γ
δ
)
z1 = γz1.
Value of Innovation and Imitation. The firm which makes the innovation first is
awarded a patent of positive value P > 0, whereas its rival receives nothing if patent protec-
tion is perfect. If patent protection is imperfect, the loser receives a positive payoff P , where
P > P > 0. P is understood to be the expected net present value of all future revenues
from marketing the innovation net of any costs the firm incurs in doing so. Similarly P is
the expected net present value of all future cash flows from imitating the discovery.7
Bellman Equation. Let V 1(z1, z2) denote the value of the race to firm 1 when firm 1 has
accumulated z1 ≥ 0 units of knowledge and firm 2 has accumulated z2 ≥ 0 units of knowledge.
The Bellman equation which characterizes the value function under the presumption that
firms behave optimally is given by
rV 1(z1, z2) = max
u1≥0
h1
(
P − V 1(z1, z2)
)
+ h2
(
P − V 1(z1, z2)
)− c(u1)
+V 11 (z1, z2)z˙1 + V
1
2 (z1, z2)z˙2, (1)
where V 1i denotes the partial derivative of V
1 with respect to zi. r > 0 is the interest rate
and the cost incurred to acquire knowledge at rate u1 is c(u1) = 1ηu
η
1. η > 1 measures the
elasticity of the cost function. The value function V 1(z1, z2) can be interpreted as the asset
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or option value to firm 1 of participating in the race. This option is priced by requiring that
the opportunity cost of holding it, rV 1(z1, z2), equals the current cash flow, −c(u1), plus the
expected capital gain or loss flow. The latter is composed of three parts, namely the capital
gain from winning the race, P − V 1(z1, z2), times the likelihood of doing so, h1, the capital
loss from losing the race, P −V 1(z1, z2), times the likelihood of doing so, h2, and the capital
gain or loss flow attributable to changes in the knowledge stocks V 11 (z1, z2)z˙1+V
1
2 (z1, z2)z˙2.
Current R&D Effort. Differentiating the right-hand side of the Bellman equation (1)
yields firm 1’s FOC for an interior solution. Since η > 1, the FOC is also sufficient. Hence,
u1∗(z1, z2) =
(
λ(P − V 1(z1, z2)) + V 11 (z1, z2)
) 1
η−1 . (2)
The firm has two incentives to engage in R&D. First, as the firm invests an additional dollar
in R&D, its chances of making the discovery at this point in time increase by λ. Since the
capital gain from winning the race is P−V 1(z1, z2), the marginal benefit accruing to the firm
is λ(P − V 1(z1, z2)). Second, the firm adds to its knowledge stock which carries a marginal
benefit of V 11 (z1, z2).
Equilibrium. Tractability requires a restriction of the notion of a strategy when analyzing
differential games. I focus on symmetric stationary Nash equilibria in feedback strategies
as given by equation (2) (e.g., Basar & Olsder (1999)). A firm’s strategy thus maps the
accumulated knowledge of firms 1 and 2 into a rate of knowledge acquisition. The feedback
strategy in equation (2) is constructed using the Bellman equation (1), and thus ensures that
the firm behaves optimally at all points (z1, z2) of the state space, irrespective of whether
these knowledge stocks are on or off the equilibrium path.
Define V 1(z1, z2) = V (z1, z2) and u1∗(z1, z2) = u∗(z1, z2). Then, using symmetry, the
value of the race to firm 2 when firm 1 has accumulated z1 units of knowledge and firm 2 has
accumulated z2 units of knowledge is given by V 2(z1, z2) = V (z2, z1) and firm 2’s equilibrium
strategy is u2∗(z1, z2) = u∗(z2, z1). At a symmetric Nash equilibrium in feedback strategies,
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the Bellman equation (1) at u1 = u∗(z1, z2) and u2 = u∗(z2, z1) can be rewritten as the
operator equation
N (V ) = 0, (3)
where
N (V )(z1, z2) =
(
λu∗(z1, z2) + γz
ψ
1
)
P +
(
λu∗(z2, z1) + γz
ψ
2
)
P − 1
η
u∗(z1, z2)η
−
(
r + λu∗(z1, z2) + γz
ψ
1 + λu
∗(z2, z1) + γz
ψ
2
)
V (z1, z2)
+V1(z1, z2)(u∗(z1, z2)− δz1) + V2(z1, z2)(u∗(z2, z1)− δz2). (4)
The operator equation (3) defines a nonlinear first-order partial differential equation (PDE).
This PDE does not in general allow for an analytic solution, and in the next section, I present
a numerical method for solving it.
3 Computation
I employ projection methods or, more precisely, collocation techniques (Judd 1992, Judd
1998, chap. 11) to solve the PDE defined by the operator equation (3). The idea underlying
projection methods is to convert the infinite-dimensional problem of solving the PDE for the
unknown value function into a finite-dimensional problem of finding a zero of a system of
equations. I accomplish this by approximating the value function by a high-order polynomial.
Hence, instead of having to solve for the unknown value function, I only need to solve for
the unknown coefficients of the polynomial approximation. The unknown coefficients in turn
are chosen such that the polynomial approximation satisfies the PDE at some appropriately
chosen points in the state space.
In a previous attempt to model an R&D race without the restrictive assumption of
an exponential distribution of success times, Judd (1985) employs perturbation methods.
However, the validity of Judd’s (1985) approximations hinges on the value of the innovation
being sufficiently small. The reason is that he uses the degenerate case of P = 0 as a starting
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point to approximate the solution to “nearby” cases in which the value of the patent is small.8
In contrast, the projection methods I use do not rely on P ≈ 0, and allow me to solve the
PDE for an arbitrary value of the patent.
Approximating the Value Function. I approximate V (z1, z2) using a tensor product
basis9 of univariate Chebyshev polynomials,
Vˆ (z1, z2) =
K∑
k1=0
K∑
k2=0
θk1,k2Tk1(z1)Tk2(z2),
where Tki(zi) is a kith order Chebyshev polynomial in zi (Judd 1998, pp. 204) and θ =
(θk1,k2) is a vector of (K + 1)
2 unknown coefficients. K is the order of the approximation.
Determining the Unknown Coefficients. Substituting Vˆ (z1, z2) for V (z1, z2) in the
operator equation (3), I define the residual function
∆V (z1, z2; θ) =
1
rP
N (Vˆ )(z1, z2), (5)
where I divide by rP to make the residual function unit-free. While the unknown true value
function by construction satisfies N (V )(z1, z2) = 0 at all points (z1, z2) of the state space,
the polynomial approximation will generally not. Hence, there will generally be a nonzero
residual. By choosing the unknown coefficients θ such that the residual is “small”, I ensure
that the polynomial approximation is “close to” the value function.
Collocation methods choose θ to ensure that the residual function is zero at (K + 1)2
so-called collocation points (zk11 , z
k2
2 ).
10 Hence, θ is the solution to the (K + 1)2 nonlinear
equations ∆V (zk11 , z
k2
2 ; θ) = 0. While it is possible to use any collection of (K + 1)
2 points,
the Chebyshev interpolation theorem suggests using the Cartesian product of the zeros of a
(K + 1)th order univariate Chebyshev polynomial. It turns out that the “fit” is improved
by employing the expanded Chebyshev array (as defined by Judd (1998), p. 222) instead.
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Thus I use
zkii = sec
(
pi
2(K + 1)
)(
1− cos
(
2(ki + 1)− 1
2(K + 1)
pi
))(
z − z
2
)
+ z, ki = 0, . . . ,K,
which implies that zkii ∈ [z, z]. Consequently, I am able to approximate V (z1, z2) in the
region [z, z]2. Since the value of the race depends on the knowledge stocks of both firms,
V (z1, z2) has domain [0,∞)2, and I set z = 0. Clearly, z has to be large enough so that the
R&D race will have ended with probability close to one by the time that either z1(t) or z2(t)
reaches z given its initial value of z01 and z
0
2 , respectively. Of course, the appropriate choice
of z is only known ex-post and thus must be determined by experimentation. I use z = 1 in
what follows.11
Accuracy Check. The quality of the polynomial approximation of the value function
depends on the order of the approximationK. AsK increases, the polynomial approximation
becomes more flexible and “fits” the value function better. Indeed, I can make the residuals
arbitrarily small (i.e., zero up to machine precision) by choosing K large enough. On the
other hand, as K increases, so does the computational burden because a larger number
of unknown coefficients has to be determined. I choose an intermediate value of K that
ensures that the residuals ∆V (z1, z2; θ) are on the order of 10−7 to 10−10 (depending on the
parameter values). That is, the error a firm makes in computing the value of the race is
107 to 1010 times smaller than the value of the patent at all points of the state space. Put
differently, if the patent is worth a million dollars, then the firm errs by less than a cent. In
addition to being small, the residuals come close to exhibiting the equioscillation property
necessary for a best polynomial approximation. This indicates that there are no systematic
errors in the polynomial approximation. Details are presented in Appendix A.
A firm’s behavior during an R&D race is described by its policy function u∗(z1, z2), which
in turn depends on the value function V (z1, z2) and on the partial derivatives of the value
function. Hence, it is important to obtain good approximations of V1(z1, z2) and V2(z1, z2)
in addition to a good approximation of V (z1, z2). I take the partial derivatives of the
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approximation Vˆ1(z1, z2) and Vˆ2(z1, z2) as approximations of the partial derivatives V1(z1, z2)
and V2(z1, z2). In general, even if Vˆ (z1, z2) converges to V (z1, z2), this does not imply that
Vˆ1(z1, z2) and Vˆ2(z1, z2) converge to V1(z1, z2) and V2(z1, z2), respectively. This raises the
question of how good the partial derivatives of the approximation are as approximations of
the partial derivatives, a question that has received scant attention in the literature to date.
I develop a general method that allows me to answer this question. The idea is that
although the partial derivatives of the true value function are unknown, expressions for
them can be derived.12 Analogously to the residual function ∆V (z1, z2; θ) in equation (5), I
define two additional residual functions
∆V1(z1, z2; θ) =
z
rP
∂
∂z1
N (Vˆ )(z1, z2),
∆V2(z1, z2; θ) =
z
rP
∂
∂z2
N (Vˆ )(z1, z2)
corresponding to the two partial derivatives of the value function.13 If these residuals are
small, then the partial derivatives of the polynomial approximation should be close to the
unknown true partial derivatives. Given the intermediate value of K that I have chosen, it
turns out that the residuals ∆V1(z1, z2; θ) and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ) are on the order of 10−4 to 10−8
(again depending on the parameter values, see Appendix A). That is, the error a firm makes
in computing the value of additional knowledge is 104 to 108 times smaller than the value
of the patent at all points of the state space. In short, the collocation techniques I employ
deliver an extremely accurate approximation not only of the value function but also of the
policy function.
Simulating the Time Paths. Once approximations of the value function and its partial
derivatives have been obtained, they can be used to simulate the evolution of the R&D race
over time. I employ Euler’s method (Judd 1998, chap. 10) to solve the system of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs)
z˙i(t) = uˆi∗(z1(t), z2(t))− δzi(t), zi(0) = z0i , (6)
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over the interval [0,T], where T is constrained by the requirement that z ≤ zi ≤ z.14 z0i
is firm i’s initial knowledge stock and uˆi∗(z1, z2) is given by equation (2) (with V (z1, z2)
replaced by Vˆ (z1, z2)).
Solving the system of ODEs given by equation (6) yields hi(t), the hazard rate of a
successful innovation by firm i, as a by-product. While the hazard rates are not of immediate
interest themselves, they allow me to compute the probability that the R&D race has ended
at or before time t, which is given by
p(t) = Prob (τ ≤ t) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ t
0
h1(s) + h2(s)ds
)
, (7)
where τ = min{τ1, τ2} and τi is the random date of a successful innovation by firm i. In
addition, I compute the probability that firm i has won the race given that the race has
ended at or before time t,
pi(t) = Prob (τi = τ |τ ≤ t) =
∫ t
0 hi(s)(1− p(s))ds
p(t)
. (8)
I numerically integrate using the trapezoid rule (Judd 1998, Chap. 7).15
Parameterization. Since the emphasis of this paper is on the role of knowledge accumu-
lation in an R&D race, the functional form of the hazard rate is of primary importance. In
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, I focus on five scenarios that capture a wide range of functional forms
(see Table 1). First, I look at the special case in which the hazard rate depends on current
R&D effort alone (γ = 0). Next, I analyze the polar case in which the hazard rate depends
on past R&D effort alone (λ = 0). In this case, a firm’s current R&D effort does not directly
help it to win the race, but indirectly helps it to win the race by adding to its knowledge
stock. Between these extreme cases are parameterizations in which both current and past
R&D efforts enter the hazard rate. My starting point is λ = γ = ψ = 1, leading to a model
in which the hazard rate is linear in the firm’s knowledge stock. Then I allow for a nonlinear
influence of past R&D efforts, and set ψ = 12 and ψ = 2 to obtain a concave or a convex
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hazard rate, respectively. Moreover, I set δ = 0.2, r = 0.105, η = 2, and P/P = 0.2 in all
five scenarios. Hence, the degree of patent protection is intermediate (I also examine the
extreme cases of P = 0 and P = P in Section 4.1).
By changing the functional form of the hazard rate, I change the distribution of success
times and thereby the duration of the race. It is to be expected that knowledge accumulation
is per se of greater importance in a longer race than in a shorter race. Thus, in order to
isolate the role of the functional form of hazard rate, I hold the expected duration of the race
constant. To this end, I choose the remaining parameter P such that the expected duration
of the race is 3 years in all five scenarios. Clearly, the expected duration also depends on the
initial knowledge stocks of the competing firms, and I set z01 = z
0
2 = 0 for now (I allow for an
initial asymmetry in firms’ knowledge stocks in Section 4.2). The expected duration of the
race along with the values for δ, r, η, and P/P are chosen to be somewhat representative of
the R&D process in a wide range of industries.16
4 Results
In this section, I discuss the strategic implications of knowledge accumulation in an R&D
race. The results of the numerical analysis are presented as follows: I first look at firms’
behavior given their knowledge stocks as implied by the value and policy functions (Section
4.1). To track the evolution of the race, I then analyze the time paths of some variables of
interest (Section 4.2). While Sections 4.1 and 4.2 focus on the five scenarios listed in Table
1, I solve the model for a wide range of parameter values in Section 4.3 to arrive at general
results.
4.1 Equilibrium Payoffs and Strategies
In what follows, I discuss the properties of the value and policy functions. I focus on R&D
expenditures c(u∗(z1, z2)), an increasing and convex transformation of current R&D effort
u∗(z1, z2), because R&D expenditures are measured in terms of monetary units divided by
time units rather than “knowledge units” per unit of time. Figure 1 depicts c(u∗(z1, z2)) for
14
the scenarios listed in Table 1.
I start with the case of γ = 0, where the hazard rate is a function of current R&D effort
alone. This case corresponds to the memoryless R&D race models analyzed by Reinganum
(1981, 1982). The equilibrium payoffs and strategies are constant and thus independent of
firms’ knowledge stocks.
The Pure Knowledge Effect. Once I relax the restrictive assumption of an exponential
distribution of success times, the equilibrium payoffs and strategies are no longer constant.
The reason is that in this more general setting knowledge is productive. Indeed, it can be
shown that limz1→∞ V (z1, z2) = P and limz2→∞ V (z1, z2) = P . That is, a firm benefits in
the limit as the size of its own knowledge stock approaches infinity because it wins the race
for sure whereas the firm loses the race for sure as the size of its rival’s knowledge stock
approaches infinity.
The fact that knowledge is productive influences firms’ behavior. Indeed, as Figure 1
shows, a firm’s R&D expenditures c(u∗(z1, z2)) are decreasing in its own knowledge stock
z1 in the case of past R&D effort alone (top left panel), the case of a linear hazard rate
(top right panel), and the case of a concave hazard rate (bottom left panel). Underlying
this result is what could be called the pure knowledge effect. The pure knowledge effect is
independent of strategic considerations. It comes about because a firm’s past R&D efforts
contribute to its chances of winning the R&D race. Due to the pure knowledge effect, the
firm can afford to scale back its investment in R&D as its knowledge stock increases.
In the case of a convex hazard rate (bottom right panel), the increasing returns nature
of the hazard rate gives a firm a strong and growing incentive to invest in R&D that initially
offsets the pure knowledge effect. However, the pure knowledge effect eventually dominates,
i.e., c(u∗(z1, z2)) first increases in z1, then decreases.
Leader versus Follower. One of the most important aspects of a race is how the strategic
interactions between the racing firms depend on their relative positions. In memoryless
R&D races, the leading firm invests the same in R&D as the lagging firm because, as noted
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previously, the equilibrium strategies are independent of firms’ knowledge stocks. Hence, the
distinction between leader and follower is irrelevant in these models, and there is no sense
in which one can properly speak of one competitor being ahead of another, or of the two
competitors being neck-and-neck.
In multi-stage models, the follower devotes less resources to R&D than the leader. That
is, the follower tends to give way to the leader, and a pattern of increasing dominance (or
its stronger form – ²-preemption) arises. The reason lies in the pure progress effect which,
independently of strategic considerations, causes a firm to increase its ivestment in R&D as
it gets closer to the finishing line (Grossman & Shapiro 1987). The intuition is simply that
the gain from winning the race from the intermediate stage of a two-stage race is larger than
the gain from making the intermediate discovery from the initial stage.
In my model, a firm is able to conserve on its R&D investment as its knowledge stock
increases due to the pure knowledge effect. Moreover, the firm with the larger knowledge
stock is able to conserve more on its investment in R&D than the firm with the smaller
knowledge stock. The follower thus devotes more resources to R&D than the leader, i.e.,
c(u∗(z1, z2)) > c(u∗(z2, z1)) if and only if z1 < z2. The pattern of strategic interactions
among the racing firms is thus more like action-reaction than increasing dominance.
As can be seen from the levels of R&D expenditures in Figure 1, the follower tries to
catch up with the leader in the case of past R&D effort alone, the case of a linear hazard rate,
and the case of a concave hazard rate. The case of a convex hazard rate is again somewhat
different because the increasing returns nature of the hazard rate initially offsets the pure
knowledge effect. Consequently, the follower at first devotes less resources to R&D than the
leader, i.e., c(u∗(z1, z2)) < c(u∗(z2, z1)) if z1 is small and z1 < z2, whereas the follower later
on devotes more resources to R&D than the leader, i.e., c(u∗(z1, z2)) > c(u∗(z2, z1)) if z1 is
large and z1 < z2. A closer inspection shows that a sufficient condition for c(u∗(z1, z2)) >
c(u∗(z2, z1)) is z1 ≥ 0.6446−z2 and z1 < z2. In sum, in the case of a convex hazard rate, the
laggard strives to catch up with the leader once he has a sufficiently large knowledge stock
himself.
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The extent to which the follower’s current R&D effort exceeds the leader’s depends on
the functional form of the hazard rate. In the case of a linear hazard rate, for example, the
difference between the follower’s and the leader’s current R&D effort is larger than in the
case of past R&D effort alone. To see the reason for this, note that the follower works harder
than the leader if and only if c(u∗(z1, z2)) > c(u∗(z2, z1)) for all z1 < z2 which is equivalent
to
−λV (z1, z2) + V1(z1, z2) > −λV (z2, z1) + V1(z2, z1)
for all z1 < z2. In the case of λ = 0, a necessary and sufficient condition is thus V1(z1, z2) >
V1(z2, z1). In the case of λ > 0, V1(z1, z2) > V1(z2, z1) and V (z1, z2) < V (z2, z1) are jointly
sufficient. But since the leader’s chances of winning the race ceteris paribus exceed that of
the follower, the value of the race to the follower is less than the value to the leader, i.e.,
V (z1, z2) < V (z2, z1) if and only if z1 < z2. Hence, the effect of the slope of the value
function is reinforced by the effect of its level.17
Aggressive versus Submissive Response: Size of Knowledge Stock. A further
question of interest is how a firm’s R&D expenditures depends on its rival’s knowledge
stock. There are two possibilities. First, the firm may decide to invest more as its rival’s
knowledge stock increases, i.e., the firm may respond aggressively. Alternatively, it may
reduce its investment in R&D in response to an increase in its rival’s knowledge stock, i.e.,
it may respond submissively.
Multi-stage models suggest a submissive response on the part of the follower, thus rein-
forcing the pattern of increasing dominance. Specifically, the follower slows down as he falls
further behind whereas the leader may or may not speed up as he gets further ahead. In
contrast, I find that a firm can either respond aggressively or submissively to an increase in
its rival’s knowledge stock, i.e., c(u∗(z1, z2)) can be either increasing or decreasing in z2. In
my model, an aggressive or submissive response is not tied to a firm’s relative position.
To see what determines whether a firm responds aggressively or submissively, consider
the case of past R&D effort alone. Inspection of the partial derivatives of c(u∗(z1, z2)) reveals
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that ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(z1, z2)) > 0 whenever z1 ≥ 0.6886 + 0.4856z2. Hence, a firm with a sufficiently
large knowledge stock increases its own R&D effort as its rival accumulates knowledge. This
aggressive response is confined to the leading firm (i.e., to points below the diagonal of the
state space) whereas the lagging firm always responds submissively.
For other functional forms of the hazard rate, also the lagging firm may respond ag-
gressively. Compared to the case of past R&D effort alone, the region of the state space
where c(u∗(z1, z2)) increases in z2 expands to include points above the diagonal in the case
of a linear hazard rate. Indeed, a closer inspection shows that a sufficient condition for
∂
∂z2
c(u∗(z1, z2)) to be positive is z1 ≥ 0.2157+0.1894z2. To see the reason for this, note that
the firm responds aggressively if and only if
−λV2(z1, z2) + V12(z1, z2) > 0.
From the above expression it is clear that in the case of λ = 0, a necessary and sufficient
condition for an aggressive response is V12(z1, z2) > 0. In the case of λ > 0, V12(z1, z2) > 0
and V2(z1, z2) < 0 are jointly sufficient. But since the value of the race to the firm is
decreasing in its rival’s knowledge stock, the first effect is reinforced by the second. Hence,
unlike the case of past R&D effort alone, the laggard may respond aggressively.
To summarize, in my model a firm responds aggressively if it has a sufficiently large
knowledge stock and submissively otherwise. The finding that the lagging firm may responds
aggressively seems counterintuitive at first glance because one would expect the laggard to
realize that there is no point in trying even harder as its rival advances. On the other
hand, each firm invests in R&D up to a point where the expected marginal benefit equals
the marginal cost. Since the probability that firm 2 wins the R&D race in the next short
interval of time dt is increasing in z2, the probability that firm 1 has to sustain whatever
current R&D effort it chooses beyond time t+dt is decreasing in z2. Hence, the point where
the expected marginal benefit of investment in R&D equals its marginal cost is reached for
an increasing level of R&D investment. Phrased differently, as firm 2 advances, firm 1 takes
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its chances and invests heavily but briefly in R&D. Moreover, since the expected duration of
the remainder of the race is also decreasing in z1, an aggressive response from firm 1 becomes
more likely as it accumulates knowledge.
Aggressive versus Submissive Response: Value of Patent. Whether a firm responds
aggressively or submissively to an increase in its rival’s knowledge stock may also depend
on the value of the patent. Figure 2 illustrates this for the case of a linear hazard rate.
It presents the policy functions for P = 0.00435 (left panel) and P = 0.435 (right panel).
Current R&D effort and the value of the race are increasing in P . Moreover, as the value of
the patent increases and competition becomes fiercer, a firm tends to respond aggressively
rather than submissively as its rival accumulates knowledge. In fact, if P = 0.00435, then
∂
∂z2
c(u∗(z1, z2)) < 0 (submissive response), whereas, if P = 0.435, then ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(z1, z2)) > 0
(aggressive response). Put differently, in this example, ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(z1, z2)) switches sign as P
increases. This demonstrates the limitations of Judd’s (1985) analysis, who assumes that
the value of the patent is close to zero in order to obtain ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(z1, z2)) < 0.
Intensity of Competition. I measure the intensity of competition as the sum of firms’
R&D expenditures c(u∗(z1, z2))+ c(u∗(z2, z1)). As Figure 3 shows for the scenarios listed in
Table 1, c(u∗(z1, z2))+ c(u∗(z2, z1)) is quasi-concave in the case of a convex hazard rate and
convex in the remaining cases involving γ > 0.
In multi-stage races, once a firm has gained an advantage over its rival, it tends to win
the race. Consequently, the outcome of the race is “decided” while firms are neck-and-neck,
and competition is fiercest in these situations. I obtain a similar result in the case of a convex
hazard rate: Since c(u∗(z1, z2))+c(u∗(z2, z1)) is quasi-concave, competition is equally intense
on an ellipsis with center on the diagonal. This implies that, holding the combined amount
of knowledge constant, competition is more intense among firms with equal knowledge stocks
than among firms with unequal knowledge stocks. In contrast, c(u∗(z1, z2)) + c(u∗(z2, z1))
is convex for the other functional forms of the hazard rate. Hence, holding their combined
knowledge constant, competition is most intense when firms have unequal knowledge stocks.
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Degree of Patent Protection. Patent protection is perfect if P = 0 and completely
ineffective if P = P . Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the degree of patent protection for
the case of a linear hazard rate. It describes the equilibrium strategies for P = 0 (left panel)
and P = P (right panel). Current R&D effort is decreasing and the value of the race to
a firm is increasing in P/P . As the value of imitation increases from 0 to P , competition
softens and, as Figure 4 shows, the policy function change its shape. Moreover, a firm’s
value function is no longer decreasing in its rival’s knowledge stock. The reason is that the
character of the R&D race changes from a preemption game into a waiting game as the
degree of patent protection decreases.
To see this, I compare the planner’s solution (collusive solution) to the noncooperative
outcome. In a winner-take-all situation in which the winning firm is awarded a patent of
positive value whereas the losing firm receives nothing (P = 0), there is rent dissipation
because each firm invests excessively in R&D. Since the two firms compete for the same
discovery, each additional dollar invested in R&D brings a firm closer to winning the race
and, at the same time, brings its rival closer to losing the race. Hence, its R&D efforts
impose a negative externality on its rival, and the firm consequently invests excessively in
R&D. In the polar case in which the loser can costlessly and immediately imitate the winner
and thus both firms receive the same payoff (P = P ), there is again rent dissipation, but the
reason is now that firms invest too little in R&D. In contrast to a winner-take-all situation,
each additional dollar invested in R&D brings both firms closer to the finish line. Hence,
a firm’s R&D efforts impose a positive externality on its rivals, which causes the firm to
underinvest in R&D. In other words, depending on whether patent protection is perfect or
completely ineffective, a firm’s R&D efforts impose a negative or a positive externality on
its rival, and the character of the R&D race changes from a preemption game into a waiting
game.18
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4.2 Time Paths
Given firms’ knowledge stocks, the value and policy functions provide a “snapshot” of the
R&D race. But since firms’ knowledge stocks are changing over time, it is crucial to know
how these “snapshots” fit together. Thus, in this section, I look at the time paths of some
variables of interest and show how knowledge accumulation affects the evolution of the race.
Knowledge Stocks. Figure 5 shows the vector field for the case of a convex hazard rate
(see Table 1). The vector field indicates the direction and speed of movement of the state
variables as given by (z˙1, z˙2) for each point (z1, z2) in the state space. It thus summarizes
the time paths of firms’ knowledge stocks for all possible initial positions. Note that since
the equilibrium is symmetric and accumulated knowledge evolves deterministically, firms are
neck-and-neck at all times during the R&D race if they start from the same position. More-
over, starting from different positions, firms’ knowledge stocks eventually reach a symmetric
steady state.19 Hence, an initial asymmetry in firms’ knowledge stocks vanishes over time.
The fact that the gap between firms’ knowledge stocks closes over time contrasts with the
pattern of increasing dominance that emerges in multi-stage races.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the race when firm 1 starts with 50% of the steady-
state knowledge stock and firm 2 starts from scratch. I use the system of ODEs given
by equation (6) to compute the time path of firm i’s accumulated knowledge, zi(t), and
then obtain the time path of its R&D expenditures, c(u∗i (t)).
20 A dash-dotted (dashed) line
designates firm 1 (firm 2). As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 6, the follower catches up
with the leader as the knowledge stocks monotonically approach the steady state over time,
i.e., zi(t)→ 0.5435 as t→∞. There are two reasons for this: First, at all times the impact
of depreciation is worse for the leader than it is for the follower. Second, as the middle panel
of Figure 6 shows, the leader decreases its R&D expenditures over time whereas the follower
initially increases its R&D expenditures markedly and eventually decreases them slightly.
Overall, while the follower at first invests less in R&D than the leader, he eventually invests
more, which causes the gap to shrink.
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The Pure Knowledge Effect versus Strategic Considerations. The pure knowledge
effect provides a firm with an incentive to decrease its R&D expenditures as its own knowl-
edge stock becomes larger. A firm may, however, also decide to be aggressive and increase
its R&D expenditures as its rival’s knowledge stock becomes larger. The question then is
which incentive dominates.
Consider again the case of a convex hazard rate and recall that firm 1’s R&D expenditures
decrease over time (middle panel of Figure 6). A closer inspection shows that the time
paths of z1(t) and z2(t) traverse a region of the state space where ∂∂z1 c(u
1∗(z1, z2)) < 0
and ∂∂z2 c(u
1∗(z1, z2)) > 0. This gives rise to two contradicting incentives: First, as firm
1 increases its knowledge stock, the pure knowledge effect provides it with an incentive to
decrease its R&D expenditures. Second, as firm 2 increases its knowledge stock, firm 1
responds aggressively and thus has an incentive to increase its R&D expenditures. The pure
knowledge effect prevails, and firm 1 decreases its investment in R&D as the race unfolds.
The pure knowledge effect also prevails in the case of a linear hazard rate (see again Table
1). For example, if firm 1 begins the race with 150% of the steady-state knowledge stock and
firm 2 starts from scratch, then z1(t) is monotonically decreasing and z2(t) is monotonically
increasing (top panel of Figure 7). Since ∂∂z2 c(u
2∗(z1, z2)) < 0 and ∂∂z1 c(u
2∗(z1, z2)) < 0
along these time paths, as firm 2 extends its knowledge stock, it has an incentive to decrease
its R&D expenditures whereas, it has an incentive to increase its R&D expenditures as firm
1 extends its knowledge stock. The middle panel of Figure 7 shows that firm 2’s R&D
expenditures decrease over time. Hence, the pure knowledge effect dominates over strategic
considerations
Conditional Probability of Winning the Race. In the case of γ = 0, where the hazard
rate is a function of current R&D effort alone, both firms have equal chances of winning the
race. In particular, a firm’s chances of winning are independent of the knowledge stocks
at the outset of the race. In contrast, once the restrictive assumption of an exponential
distribution of success times is relaxed, an initial asymmetry in the knowledge stocks affects
22
a firm’s chances of winning the race.
To see this, consider again the case of a linear hazard rate. I use equation (7) to compute
p(t), the probability that one of the firms wins the race at or before time t, and equation (8)
to compute pi(t), the probability that firm i has won the race given that the race has ended
at or before time t. A solid line refers to p(t) and a dash-dotted (dashed) line designates
firm 1 (firm 2). Firm 2 works harder than firm 1 at all times, thereby narrowing the gap
between the firms’ knowledge stocks over time. As a result firm 2’s conditional probability
of winning increases from 0.1437 to 0.2817 whereas firm 1’s conditional probability decreases
from 0.8563 to 0.7183 (bottom panel of Figure 7).
In sum, although the gap between the firms’ knowledge stocks closes over time, this does
not quite suffice to make up for an initial asymmetry. The laggard’s conditional probability
of winning remains less than the leader’s. This also clarifies why the leader is willing to cut
back on its R&D investment in the first place: Doing so simply does not severely reduce its
chances of winning the race.
4.3 General Results
In this section, I solve the model for a wide range of parameter values in order to “establish”
general results about the equilibrium payoffs and strategies and the induced time paths. I
consider all parameterizations such that P ∈ {0.00435, 0.0435, 0.435}, P/P ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.8},
λ ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}, γ ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}, ψ ∈ {1, 2}, δ ∈ {0, 0.2, 2}, and η ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Note that the
interest rate r merely determines the time scale, and is therefore not of interest by itself.21
This set of 1458 parameterizations contains the case of a linear hazard rate (see Table 1)
that I have studied in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. There I have also highlighted the differences
between a linear and a convex hazard rate. Consequently, I specify a linear hazard rate
(ψ = 1) in 729 parameterizations and a convex hazard rate (ψ = 2) in the others.22
To compute the value and policy functions, I proceed as follows. Given a parameter-
ization, I first solve the model for different orders of approximation. Specifically, I use
K = 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 for all parameterizations and, in addition, K = 13, 15, 17, 19 for some pa-
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rameterizations. Then I pick the order of approximation that yields the smallest residuals of
the value function and its partial derivatives. In 3% of the parameterizations, the residuals
are unacceptably large23, and I ignore these parameterizations. There is a small number
(less than 1%) of parameterizations that contradict the results stated below. A closer in-
spection shows that these contradictions arise because of numerical problems (e.g., round-off
error or numerical instability of the polynomial approximation). I therefore disregard these
parameterizations in what follows.
Median Duration of the Race. I use equation (7) to compute p(t), the probability that
the race ends at or before time t. Judging from the median durations (defined as the solution
to p(t) = 0.5), the remaining parameterizations capture a wide range of R&D processes: In
10% of parameterizations the median duration of the race is below 0.1 years, in 50% it is
below one year, and in 90% it is below 30.2 years. The following result summarizes the
comparative statics properties of the median duration.
Result 1 The median duration is decreasing in P , λ, γ, and η.
The effect of a change in P/P , ψ, and δ is ambiguous.
Knowledge Stocks. I argued in Section 4.2 that the knowledge stocks approach a steady
state provided that the rate of depreciation is positive. I compute the steady-steady knowl-
edge stock z∞ = limt→∞ zi(t). The following result summarizes its comparative statics
properties.
Result 2 The steady-state knowledge stock z∞ is increasing in P and λ and decreasing in
P/P and δ.
To get a sense for how fast the steady-state knowledge stock is approached, I linearize
the system of ODEs given by equation (6) around z∞ and compute its eigenvalues.
Result 3 The eigenvalues of the linearized system are real and negative. The eigenvalues
are decreasing in δ.
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Since the eigenvalues are real and negative, the system of ODEs given by equation (6) is
locally stable. The largest (in absolute value) eigenvalue determines the rate of convergence
in the vicinity of the steady state. The above result indicates that the steady-state knowledge
stock is approached faster as the rate of depreciation increases.
Recall that I approximate the value and policy functions in the region [0, 1]2. For some
parameterizations the steady-state knowledge stock lies outside this region, so that I am
unable to exactly determine its value. In what follows, I restrict attention to the region
[0, zˆ]2, where zˆ = min{z∞, 1}. The reason is that, if z∞ ≤ 1, then firm i’s knowledge
stock zi(t) remains below zˆ provided that its initial knowledge stock z0i is sufficiently small.
Otherwise, the race has ended with high probability before zi(t) reaches zˆ.
My next result is that the laggard adds to its knowledge stock as long as its knowledge
stock is below the steady state.
Result 4 If z1 ≤ z2 < zˆ, then z˙1 > 0.24
In contrast, z1 ≤ z2 < zˆ does not imply z˙2 > 0. That is, the leader may not add to its
knowledge stock. In fact, if the firm is far ahead of its rival, then the leader may relax and
allow himself to fall back (z˙2 < 0) while the laggard builds up its knowledge stock. Then,
once the gap between the firms has closed somewhat, the leader resumes (z˙2 > 0). It follows
that the convergence to the steady state need not be monotonic.
The Pure Knowledge Effect. Recall that the pure knowledge effect arises because a
firm’s past R&D efforts contribute to its chances of winning the race. Hence, as I argued
in Section 4.1, a firm is inclined to decrease its R&D expenditures as its knowledge stock
increases. In general, the pure knowledge effect determines the shape of the policy function
if the hazard rate is linear.
Result 5 If ψ = 1, then ∂∂z1 c(u
∗(z1, z2)) < 0.
On the other hand, there is a counteracting force if the hazard rate is convex and there are
increasing returns to knowledge accumulation. However, as the following result establishes,
once the pure knowledge effect starts to dominate, it continues to do so.
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Result 6 If z′1 > z1 and
∂
∂z1
c(u∗(z1, z2)) < 0, then ∂∂z1 c(u
∗(z′1, z2)) < 0.
To see that the above result has content, note that ∂∂z1 c(u
∗(0, 0)) < 0 in 51% of parame-
terizations, ∂∂z1 c(u
∗( zˆ2 ,
zˆ
2)) < 0 in 79% of parameterizations, and
∂
∂z1
c(u∗(zˆ, zˆ)) < 0 in 83%
of parameterizations. Hence, it frequently happens that a firm decreases its investment in
R&D in response to an increase in its knowledge stock, so that the above result applies.
Leader versus Follower. Perhaps the most important implication of the pure knowledge
effect is that the follower devotes more resources to R&D than the leader, thus giving rise
to a pattern of action-reaction. The economic intuition developed for the case of a linear
hazard rate in Section 4.1 again generalizes.
Result 7 If ψ = 1 and z1 < z2, then c(u∗(z1, z2)) > c(u∗(z2, z1)).
A corollary to the above result is that ψ = 1 and z1 < z2 imply z˙1 > z˙2. Consequently, the
gap between the leader’s and the follower’s knowledge stocks closes over time.
In contrast, z1 < z2 implies c(u∗(z1, z2)) > c(u∗(z2, z1)) in 13% of parameterizations with
ψ = 2 and z1 < z2 implies z˙1 > z˙2 in 68% of parameterizations with ψ = 2. As I pointed
out in Section 4.1, the reason is that the laggard may not strive to catch up with the leader
until he has a sufficiently large knowledge stock himself.
Aggressive versus Submissive Response. A firm can either respond aggressively or
submissively to an increase in its rival’s knowledge stock. As I claimed in Section 4.1, a
firm responds aggressively if it has a sufficiently large knowledge stock and submissively
otherwise. The following result pertains to all parameterizations with ψ = 1 and establishes
that, once a firm starts to respond aggressively, it continues to respond aggressively.
Result 8 If ψ = 1, z′1 > z1, and
∂
∂z2
c(u∗(z1, z2)) > 0 then ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(z′1, z2)) > 0.
Moreover, the above result extends to 98% of parameterization with ψ = 2. Again this has
content because ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(0, 0)) > 0 in 49% of parameterizations, ∂∂z2 c(u
∗( zˆ2 ,
zˆ
2)) > 0 in 57%
of parameterizations, and ∂∂z2 c(u
∗(zˆ, zˆ)) > 0 in 65% of parameterizations.
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Intensity of Competition. My final result shows that, holding the combined amount of
knowledge constant, competition is fiercest when firms have unequal knowledge stocks; it
pertains to all parameterizations with ψ = 1.
Result 9 If ψ = 1 and 0 < λ < 1, then
 c(u
∗(z, 0)) + c(u∗(0, z)) > c(u∗(λz, (1− λ)z)) + c(u∗((1− λ)z, λz)), z ≤ zˆ,
c(u∗(zˆ, z − zˆ)) + c(u∗(z − zˆ, zˆ)) > c(u∗(zˆ1, zˆ2)) + c(u∗(zˆ2, zˆ1)), z > zˆ,
where zˆ1 = (2λ− 1)zˆ + (1− λ)z and zˆ2 = (1− 2λ)zˆ + λz.
In contrast, in 74% of parameterizations with ψ = 2, competition is fiercest when firms have
equal knowledge stocks.
5 Conclusions
I develop a general model of an R&D race that incorporates knowledge accumulation. The
model does not allow for an analytic solution, and I use projection methods to obtain the
equilibrium payoffs and strategies. I propose a method to check the accuracy of the approxi-
mations. The approximations seem to be close to both the true value function and its partial
derivatives, and thus give an accurate description not only of the equilibrium payoffs but
also of the equilibrium strategies. This suggests that projection techniques are a promising
tool for the analysis of differential games.
My model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution
that troubles existing models of R&D races. Indeed, the memoryless R&D race models ana-
lyzed by Reinganum (1981, 1982) are a special case of my model, and I show how relaxing the
restrictive assumption of an exponential distribution of success times affects the equilibrium
payoffs and strategies. In the more general setting of my model, knowledge accumulation
has strategic implications.
In particular, I show that a firm has an incentive to reduce its R&D expenditures as its
knowledge stock increases. Underlying this result is the pure knowledge effect. The source
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of this effect is that a firm’s past R&D efforts contribute to its chances of winning the R&D
race because the firm’s knowledge stock enters its hazard rate. If the hazard rate is concave
or linear, the pure knowledge effect determines the shape of the policy function and implies
that the follower works harder than the leader. If the hazard rate is convex and there are
increasing returns to knowledge accumulation, then a firm has a strong and growing incentive
to invest in R&D. While this gives rise to a counteracting force, the pure knowledge effect
gathers force as the race unfolds. Hence, once he has a sufficiently large knowledge stock
himself, the laggard strives to catch up with the leader. The pattern of strategic interactions
among the racing firms is thus more like action-reaction than increasing dominance, the
pattern that emerges in multi-stage race models.
In multi-stage race models, the follower slows down as he falls further behind whereas
the leader may or may not speed up as he gets further ahead. In contrast, I find that a
firm can either respond aggressively or submissively to an increase in its rival’s knowledge
stock. In my model, an aggressive or submissive response is not tied to a firm’s relative
position. Rather, a firm responds aggressively if it has a sufficiently large knowledge stock
and submissively otherwise. These strategic considerations appear to be dominated by the
pure knowledge effect in the sense that the response in the firm’s investment in R&D to a
change in its own knowledge stock swamps the response to a change in its rival’s knowledge
stock.
Also in contrast to multi-stage race models, I show that competition is not necessarily
fiercest when firms are neck-and-neck. If the hazard rate is linear, competition among firms
is most intense when their knowledge stocks are of unequal size and least intense when they
are of equal size, whereas this need not be the case if the hazard rate is convex.
Despite the abundance of anecdotal evidence, empirical research on R&D races is sparse.
In line with my model, the available studies observe patterns of strategic interactions that
are more akin to action-reaction than to increasing dominance. Grabowski & Baxter (1973)
find that in the chemical industry firms increase R&D expenditures in response to rivals’
outlays. Based on a sample of 28 U.S. manufacturing industries, exploratory research by
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Richard Caves25 indicates that leaders and followers react positively to each other’s increases
in R&D expenditures, and Scherer (1992) finds that firms with greater domestic sales in more
concentrated U.S. markets were likely to react much more aggressively to increasing import
competition than smaller firms or firms in less concentrated markets. More recent stud-
ies attempt to operationalize the notion of a knowledge stock. Khanna (1995) proposes to
measure a firm’s technological position relative to its rivals by constructing a technological
frontier for the high-end computer industry. He shows that firms that fall behind the tech-
nological frontier engage in catch-up behavior. In his study of the disk drive industry, Lerner
(1997) attempts to directly measure a firm’s technological position relative to its rivals and
demonstrates that the firms that trail the industry leader display a greater propensity to
innovate. This again lends more support to action-reaction than to increasing dominance.
At the same time, empirical research points to a number of extensions of my model.
Studies of the pharmaceutical industry in particular highlight the role of spillovers in the
R&D process (Cockburn & Henderson 1994, Henderson & Cockburn 1994, Henderson &
Cockburn 1996). Moreover, the studies by Cohen & Levinthal (1989) and Adams & Jaffe
(1996) indicate that a firm has to itself engage in R&D in order to absorb spillovers. Ex-
tending the notion of absorptive capacity to “spillovers” from a firm’s own knowledge stock
requires specifying a nonadditive hazard rate. A multiplicative hazard rate, for example, im-
plies that the firm’s past R&D efforts are not productive unless combined with current R&D
effort. Spillovers and a nonadditive hazard rate are readily incorporated into the model.
The studies by Khanna & Iansiti (1997) and Lerner (1997) finally testify to the important
role product market competition and repeated interactions between competing firms play in
determining the outcome of an R&D race. This suggests modelling the two-way relationship
between innovative activity and market structure, a task that is left to future research.
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Appendix A Computational Details
All programs are written in Matlab 5.3. I use the equation solver c05nbf from the NAG
toolbox, a Newton method, to solve the (K+1)2 nonlinear equations ∆V (zk11 , z
k2
2 ; θ) = 0 for
θ. My starting values for the elements of θ are zeros except for θ0,0 which is chosen to solve
(with θ0,0 replacing V )
0 = λu∗(P + P )− 1
η
(u∗)η − (r + 2λu∗)V,
where
u∗ =
(
λ(P − V )) 1η−1 .
The above equations characterize the unique constant solution to the PDE defined by the
operator equation (3) in the special case of γ = 0. Good starting values are essential to
ensure convergence of the equation solver.
To validate the approximations of the value function and its partial derivatives, I compute
∆V (z1, z2; θ), ∆V1(z1, z2; θ), and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ) at 302 equidistant grid points in [z, z]2. Since
the grid points differ from the collocation points, ∆V (z1, z2; θ) is not necessarily zero at
these grid points. Moreover, there is no reason for ∆V1(z1, z2; θ) and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ) to be zero
anywhere in [z, z]2. Nevertheless, as I argued before, if all three sets of residuals are small,
then the polynomial approximation and its partial derivatives should be close to the value
function and its partial derivatives. I summarize each residual function by picking its largest
(absolute) value and denote their sup-norms as LV∞, LV1∞ , and LV2∞ , respectively.
The system of equations generally admits multiple zeros. It turns out, however, that
exactly one of these zeros gives rise to small residuals; the residuals that correspond to
the other zeros are larger by several orders of magnitude. Moreover, the equation solver
converges to this zero whenever I use the starting values described above. This suggests
that there exists a unique solution to the PDE.
Among the five scenarios listed in Table 1 on page 44, the ones involving a nonlinear
hazard rate are the most troublesome, and I devote particular attention to them in what
follows. In general, a nonlinear hazard rate adds curvature to the model, thereby making it
harder to approximate the value function. Moreover, a hazard rate of the form hi = λui+γz
ψ
i
does not have a derivative at zi = 0 if ψ < 1. This gives rise to a singularity in the case of
a concave hazard rate. I move this singularity from zi = 0 to zi = −z˜ by respecifying firm
i’s hazard rate as
hi = λui + γ
(
(zi + z˜)ψ − z˜ψ
)
if ψ < 1. Since the curvature of the hazard rate decreases as z˜ increases, a small value for z˜
is appropriate, I and set z˜ = 0.1 in what follows.
Table 2 lists the sup-norms LV∞, LV1∞ , and LV2∞ for various orders of approximation K
for the case of a convex hazard rate and Table 3 does so for the case of a concave hazard
rate. The repercussions of the singularity in the case of a concave hazard rate are still
fairly pronounced. In particular, for fixed K, the residuals for the concave hazard rate are
by several orders of magnitude larger than the residuals for the convex hazard rate and, as
K increases, they approach zero at a much slower rate. Nevertheless, the approximation
improves steadily for both parameterizations and is already quite good for intermediate
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values ofK. Moreover, the elements of θ that correspond to higher order terms are extremely
small (in absolute value) for both parameterizations.
Figure 8 displays the residual functions ∆V (z1, z2; θ), ∆V1(z1, z2; θ), and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ) for
the case of a convex hazard rate with K = 11. The residuals ∆V (z1, z2; θ) oscillate around
zero, and are close to exhibiting the equioscillation property necessary for a best (with respect
to the sup-norm) polynomial approximation. The residuals ∆V1(z1, z2; θ) and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ)
are large at the “upper” and “lower” boundaries of [z, z]2. However, the residuals are much
smaller in the interior of [z, z]2 and, as a closer inspection reveals, fluctuate around zero.
Despite the fact that the partial derivatives of the value function are approximated somewhat
worse than the value function itself, overall the choice of K = 11 leads to extremely accurate
approximations.
It remains to choose the order of approximation for the remaining parameterizations. I
set K = 19 in the case of a concave hazard rate and K = 11 in the case of past R&D effort
alone and in the case of a linear hazard rate. For the case of past R&D effort alone, I obtain
LV∞ = 2.01 × 10−10, LV1∞ = 2.52 × 10−8, and LV2∞ = 1.75 × 10−8 and for the case of a linear
hazard rate I obtain LV∞ = 5.81× 10−10, LV1∞ = 5.32× 10−8, and LV2∞ = 6.35× 10−8.
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Notes
1New York Times, January 20, 2000 and October 11, 2000.
2New York Times, September 15, 1998 and Business Week, June 12, 2000.
3Reinganum (1989) refers to memoryless R&D race models as symmetric R&D race mod-
els. There is also a third class, models of repeated races. Since these models address quite
different questions, I ignore them here. See Reinganum (1989) for a survey.
4Unfortunately, the terms increasing dominance and action-reaction have been used dif-
ferently by different authors. I take them to describe the relationship between state variables
and firms’ actions. That is, increasing dominance (action-reaction) means that the firm that
is ahead in the race invests more (less) in R&D than its rival. This has also been called weak
increasing dominance by Athey & Schmutzler (2001).
5If ψ < 1, a computational difficulty requires me to respecify firm 1’s hazard rate as
h1 = λu1 + γ
(
(z1 + z˜)ψ − z˜ψ
)
, where z˜ > 0. Details are given in Appendix A.
6I would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
7In general, further investments in R&D may be needed to arrive at a marketable product
after the discovery has been made. See Judd, Schmedders & Yeltekin (2002) for a model
that endogenizes the value of innovation along these lines.
8Judd (1985) assumes that patent protection is perfect and thus sets P = 0. Hence, if
the benefits to innovation are zero, then the equilibrium strategy is not to invest in R&D,
u∗(z1, z2) = 0, which yields a payoff of V (z1, z2) = 0.
9A comparison between tensor products and complete polynomials indicated little differ-
ence.
10I explored two alternatives to Chebyshev collocation. First, I chose the unknown coeffi-
cients to minimize the residual sum of squares at M > (K + 1)2 collocation points. Second,
I turned to Galerkin methods. Galerkin methods integrate the residual against the basis
functions and solve the resulting system of (K + 1)2 nonlinear equations for the unknown
coefficients. The differences were negligible.
11The exact value of z has little or no effect on the value and policy functions once I
compensate for increasing z by increasing K.
12This idea has also been exploited by Vedenov & Miranda (2001) in the context of a
discrete-time stochastic game.
13The resulting expressions can be simplified using the envelope theorem. The application
of the envelope theorem is justified since uˆ∗(z1, z2) by construction satisfies the FOC exactly.
14To apply Euler’s method, I specify a grid of points on the time axis, tl = ldt, l =
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0, 1, . . . , where the step size dt is small but positive, and approximate the system of differen-
tial equations with a system of difference equations, zl+1 = zl+z˙ldt, where zl = (z1(tl), z2(tl))
and z˙l = (z˙1(tl), z˙2(tl)). Starting from z0 = (z01 , z
0
2) this allows me to compute z
1 = (z11 , z
1
2),
which in turn enables me to compute z2 = (z21 , z
2
2), and so on. The error of Euler’s method
is proportional to dt, thus displaying linear convergence.
15The accuracy of the numerical integration procedure is readily checked using the fact
that p1(t) + p2(t) = 1. For dt = 10−2, the difference between p1(t) + p2(t) and unity is
on the order of 10−6 (or better depending on the exact parameterization), for dt = 10−1
(dt = 10−3) the error is on the order of 10−4 (10−8). I therefore choose dt = 10−2 in what
follows.
16The empirical literature has studied the pharmaceutical industry in great detail (e.g.,
Cockburn & Henderson (1994), Grabowski & Vernon (1994), and Henderson & Cockburn
(1996)), and I use these studies to pick parameter values.
17While V (z1, z2) determines u∗(z1, z2), the value function also takes the equilibrium strat-
egy into account. Hence, the nature of my argument is more suggestive than formal.
18See Doraszelski & Draganska (2002) for details.
19Of course, the existence of a steady state presupposes nonzero depreciation.
20c(u∗i (t)) is shorthand for c(u
i∗(z1(t), z2(t))).
21I continue to set r = 0.105.
22To double check my conclusions, I analyze an additional set of 1458 parameterizations
that entails P ∈ {0.01035, 0.1035, 1.035} instead of P ∈ {0.00435, 0.0435, 0.435}. This set
contains the case of a convex hazard rate.
23In the notation of Appendix A, a parameterization is deemed acceptable if LV∞ < 10−4,
LV1∞ < 10−2, and LV2∞ < 10−2.
24I verified this result at 302 equidistant grid points in [0, zˆ]2 for each parameterization.
A similar remark pertains to the subsequent results.
25Personal communication. See also Meron & Caves (1991).
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Figure 1: R&D expenditures c(u∗(z1, z2)) in the case of past
R&D effort alone (top left panel), linear hazard rate (top right
panel), concave hazard rate (bottom left panel), and convex
hazard rate (bottom right panel). In the case of current R&D
effort alone, c(u∗) = 0.0139 (omitted).
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Figure 2: Value of patent. R&D expenditures c(u∗(z1, z2))
for P = 0.00435 (left panel) and P = 0.435 (right panel).
Linear hazard rate.
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Figure 3: Intensity of competition c(u∗(z1, z2))+c(u∗(z2, z1))
in the case of past R&D effort alone (top left panel), linear
hazard rate (top right panel), concave hazard rate (bottom
left panel), and convex hazard rate (bottom right panel). In
the case of current R&D effort alone, 2c(u∗) = 0.0227 (omit-
ted).
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Figure 4: Degree of patent protection. R&D expenditures
c(u∗(z1, z2)) for P = 0 (left panel) and P = P (right panel).
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Figure 6: Time paths of z1(t) and z2(t) (top panel), c(u∗1(t)),
c(u∗2(t)), and c(u∗1(t)) + c(u∗2(t)) (middle panel), as well as
p1(t), p2(t), and p(t) (bottom panel). A dash-dotted (dashed)
line designates firm 1 (firm 2). Vertical lines indicate the time
by which the race has ended with a probability of 0.5, 0.9, and
0.99, respectively. Initial knowledge stocks are z01 = 0.2717
and z02 = 0. Convex hazard rate.
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Figure 7: Time paths of z1(t) and z2(t) (top panel), c(u∗1(t)),
c(u∗2(t)), and c(u∗1(t)) + c(u∗2(t)) (middle panel), as well as
p1(t), p2(t), and p(t) (bottom panel). A dash-dotted (dashed)
line designates firm 1 (firm 2). Vertical lines indicate the time
by which the race has ended with a probability of 0.5, 0.9, and
0.99, respectively. Initial knowledge stocks are z01 = 0.3673
and z02 = 0. Linear hazard rate.
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Figure 8: Residuals ∆V (z1, z2; θ) (top left panel),
∆V1(z1, z2; θ) (bottom left panel), and ∆V2(z1, z2; θ) (bottom
right panel). Convex hazard rate and K = 11.
λ γ ψ P
polar cases:
current R&D effort alone 1 0 – 0.248
past R&D effort alone 0 1 1 0.137
intermediate cases:
linear hazard rate 1 1 1 0.0435
concave hazard rate 1 1 12 0.0350
convex hazard rate 1 1 2 0.1035
Table 1: Parameter values.
K LV∞ LV1∞ LV2∞
3 5.54× 10−2 1.15 3.81× 10−1
7 1.92× 10−5 1.09× 10−3 8.43× 10−4
11 4.92× 10−8 3.99× 10−6 5.81× 10−6
15 1.37× 10−10 1.48× 10−8 3.58× 10−8
19 7.51× 10−13 8.88× 10−11 1.55× 10−10
Table 2: Sup-norms LV∞, LV1∞ , and LV2∞ for different orders of
approximation K. Convex hazard rate.
K LV∞ LV1∞ LV2∞
3 1.40× 10−1 3.27 2.12
7 2.87× 10−3 2.70× 10−1 1.74× 10−1
11 8.86× 10−5 2.31× 10−2 1.51× 10−2
15 4.98× 10−6 2.01× 10−3 1.35× 10−3
19 1.78× 10−7 1.76× 10−4 1.20× 10−4
23 1.66× 10−8 1.54× 10−5 1.06× 10−5
27 7.40× 10−10 1.34× 10−6 9.31× 10−7
Table 3: Sup-norms LV∞, LV1∞ , and LV2∞ for different orders of
approximation K. Concave hazard rate.
